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In their seminal study on the modern corporation, Berle and Means (1932)
argue that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the modern corporation
is the existence of separation between ownership and control. The owners
or shareholders of ﬁrms rarely get involved in ﬁrms’ day-to-day activities.
Instead, managers are in charge. These managers may have an incentive
to pursue opportunistic behavior at the expense of shareholders. Evidently,
this creates a conﬂict of interests between shareholders and managers. This
conﬂict of interests has become the center of attention in many corporate
governance studies.1
There is yet another important conﬂict of interests within ﬁrms. This involves
the controlling shareholder versus minority shareholders. The controlling
shareholder may pursue actions that beneﬁt her, at the expense of minority
shareholders. This conﬂict has recently received much attention in the cor-
porate governance literature. This started with the publication of a seminal
article by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), which shows that
ﬁrms often belong to a business group characterized by a complex ownership
structure. These ﬁrms are controlled through a chain of companies, where
the ultimate controlling shareholder is often a wealthy family. This structure
is usually referred to as a pyramidal ownership structure. The ultimate con-
trolling shareholder uses indirect ownership to exert control over ﬁrms that
belong to the same pyramidal chain. This implies that she is able to maintain
control with a relatively small fraction of cash ﬂow rights, thus creating a
separation between control rights and cash ﬂow rights.2
1See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for an excellent and comprehensive survey on corporate
governance.
2There are two other ways in which the controlling shareholder can create a separation
between control rights and cash ﬂow rights, without relying on the creation of a pyramidal
ownership structure. First, by issuing dual class shares, i.e. shares with diﬀerential voting
2As an illustration, suppose that a controlling shareholder (say, a family) owns
50% of ﬁrm A,a n dﬁrm A owns 30% of ﬁrm B.I nt u r nﬁrm B owns 40% of
ﬁrm C. Suppose that these are all controlling shares,3 then the family exerts
control over ﬁrm C with only 50% × 30% × 40% = 6% of cash ﬂow rights.4
There is a clear separation between voting or control rights and cash ﬂow
rights here. As a real world example, consider the Li Ka-shing conglomerate,
the largest business group in Hong Kong. Li Ka-shing and family own 35% of
Cheung Kong, which owns 34% of Hutchison Whampoa. In turn, Hutchison
Whampoa owns 60% of Cavendish International that owns 34% of Hong Kong
Electric. Li Ka-shing and family are the ultimate controlling shareholders
of Hong Kong Electric with substantial control rights but only 2.5% of cash
ﬂow rights.5
The separation between control rights and cash ﬂow rights in the pyramidal
ownership structure gives incentives for self-dealing transactions. That is, the
controlling shareholder may transfer resources from a ﬁrm in the pyramidal
chain to herself or to another (often a higher-level) ﬁrm, at the expense
of minority shareholders of the former ﬁrm. Examples include asset sales,
transfer pricing contracts that beneﬁto t h e rﬁrms in the pyramid, and simple
cash appropriation. Such activities are known as tunneling in the literature.
Clearly tunneling can be proﬁtable to the entrepreneur or family at the top
of the pyramid. As an example, suppose that a family owns 50% of ﬁrm A,
and ﬁrm A owns 50% of ﬁrm B. The family’s cash ﬂow rights are 50% in
ﬁrm A and 25% in ﬁrm B. We assume that the 50% shares are controlling
rights. Second, by establishing cross ownership with other ﬁrms. We abstract from these
issues.
3From empirical studies we know that a lower bound for controlling shares is somewhere
around 10% or 20%. See for instance La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999),
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), and Lemmon and Lins (2003).
4This assumes that other shareholders only hold small fractions of ownership in the
ﬁrms.
5See Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000, p. 97).
3shares, so ﬁrm B is controlled by ﬁrm A, which is itself controlled by the
family. Also, we assume for simplicity that funds are equally proﬁtable in
ﬁrms A and B. Denote the cash ﬂow of ﬁrm i by πi, i = A,B.F o r n o w ,
we assume no discounting. If the family decides not to tunnel, she earns
0.5πA +0.25πB. If instead the family tunnels some amount S>0f r o mﬁrm
B to ﬁrm A,s h ee a r n s0 .5(πA + S)+0.25(πB − S). The latter is higher than
the former. Therefore, even if the per-dollar return of the funds is the same
in the two ﬁrms, the family may have an incentive to tunnel. The reason is
simply that the family has higher cash ﬂow rights in the higher-level ﬁrm A,
and therefore would prefer to shift ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow to ﬁrm A whenever this
is possible. Clearly, this makes the minority shareholders of ﬁrm B worse oﬀ.
A speciﬁc type of tunneling where the transfer of resources between ﬁrms
occurs in case of ﬁnancial distress and aims to save the receiving ﬁrm from
bankruptcy is known as propping in the literature (Friedman, Johnson, and
Mitton, 2003). With propping, funds may be transferred from a lower-level to
a higher-level ﬁrm as with ‘ordinary’ tunneling, or in the opposite direction.
In the latter case, it may be interpreted as ‘reverse’ tunneling. In the remain-
der of this paper we will use the term ‘tunneling’ in a narrow interpretation,
which does not include transfers of funds to save a ﬁrm from bankruptcy, for
which we will use the term ‘propping’. Section 2 presents some real world
examples of tunneling and propping.
Both tunneling and propping may be illegal (Johnson et al., 2000; Friedman,
Johnson, and Mitton, 2003). However, as Johnson et al. (2000) illustrate, in
many countries minority shareholders are not well protected and tunneling
(and/or propping) between ﬁrms in the same group is often allowed by the
courts.6 In this paper, we focus on ‘legal’ tunneling activities. The amount
6This holds in particular for (French) civil-law countries, as opposed to common-law
countries (Johnson et al., 2000). See also our discussion in Section 2. For evidence of
propping, see Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003).
4of funds tunneled can then be interpreted as retained earnings, i.e. a part of
proﬁts that is retained and reinvested, albeit in another ﬁrm. The net proﬁts
after subtracting retained earnings are then distributed to shareholders as
dividends according to their cash ﬂow rights. The amount of proﬁts and
retained earnings are observable to all investors, however minority investors
have no control over retained earnings. Thus, we assume that tunneling
from one ﬁrm to another ﬁrm in the same group is possible (at least to some
extent), but we abstract from tunneling funds from a ﬁrm directly to the
ultimate controlling shareholder. The latter would be similar to the family
simply looting all the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow to herself as the ultimate controlling
shareholder, rather than paying out dividends according to each investor’s
(including her own) cash ﬂow rights.7 As a result, in this paper tunneling
is only possible under a pyramidal structure but not a horizontal structure
(with independent ﬁrms).8
As we explained above, the ultimate controlling shareholder of a pyramidal
structure may decide to tunnel since this increases her cash ﬂow. This sug-
gests that tunneling could be an explanation or justiﬁcation for the pyramidal
ownership structure. In this paper, we look at this issue by investigating the
incentives of a family that owns and controls a ﬁrm A to set up a new ﬁrm
7C l e a r l ys u c ha na c tc a nb ed e e m e da si l l e g a l ,a si ti sh a r dt oj u s t i f yw h yt h ec o n t r o l l i n g
family does not distribute dividends out of the company’s proﬁts. If the family argues that
the absence of dividends is due to all available cash ﬂows being retained and reinvested,
investors would demand a disclosure of information on the use of these retained earnings.
Such an act may likely lead to a court case when it is eventually discovered. A notorious
recent example is the case of Parmalat, an Italian business group owned by Tanzi family
(see The Economist, 2004). Its founder, Calisto Tanzi, personally squandered up to 800
million euro from the group. To cover up this act, he forged a bank document showing
that one of Parmalat subsidiaries had deposits amounted to 4 billion euro.
8Also note that in a pyramidal structure the burden of tunneling is born largely by
other (minority) shareholders. In a horizontal structure the controlling shareholder would
bear a greater part of the burden of tunneling, because his cash ﬂow rights are higher in the
latter structure. Hence, one can reasonably argue that even if tunneling were legal under
both structures, ceteris paribus, the amount of tunneling is higher in a pyramidal structure
than in a horizontal structure, and this would not qualitatively change our results.
5B in a pyramidal structure. Thus, ﬁrm B will be owned and controlled
indirectly via ﬁrm A, rather than as an independent ﬁrm as in a horizontal
structure. To do so, we present a formal model of tunneling and propping in a
pyramidal ownership structure that explicitly incorporates the establishment
of the lower-level ﬁrm B.
We show that indeed the possibility of tunneling and propping in the pyra-
midal ownership structure may be a justiﬁcation for using this structure, i.e.
for preferring it over the horizontal structure where it is not possible to shift
funds from one ﬁrm to another. However, when propping is not possible,
f o re x a m p l eb e c a u s ew ek n o wt h a tﬁrm B will never be in a ﬁnancial dis-
tress or propping is illegal and can be very easily veriﬁed by the court, the
family will never strictly prefer the pyramidal structure over the horizontal
structure. This is because outside (minority) investors foresee that there will
be tunneling in the pyramid and adjust their willingness to pay for ﬁrm B’s
shares at its establishment accordingly - unless when they are myopic and do
not realize the (full extent of) tunneling. With rational investors, however,
when there is some probability of ﬁnancial distress, outside investors realize
that in the pyramidal structure the controlling shareholder may prop up ﬁrm
B. This is a clear beneﬁt from the pyramidal structure, which raises their
willingness to pay for B’s shares. Thus, in this case, the family may be better
oﬀ adopting the pyramidal structure.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst discuss some re-
lated literature in Section 2. Section 3 describes a simple benchmark model of
tunneling. In that section we assume that the pyramidal structure is already
in place, and we analyze the family’s decision on how much to tunnel. This
benchmark model enables us to obtain a better understanding of tunneling
and its relationship with the quality of the legal protection of minority share-
holders. Section 4 presents the setup of the general model. There we extend
our analysis to cover both tunneling and propping. In Section 5 we solve the
6model and derive the family’s payoﬀs under the two ownership structures.
In Section 6 we compare these payoﬀs and show that tunneling alone will
not lead to the emergence of pyramidal ownership structure, but in combi-
nation with either myopic investors or propping, it may. Section 7 presents
two extensions, one on the role of cash ﬂow rights as an additional source of
funds that can facilitate propping in a pyramidal ownership structure, and
the other on the relationship between the quality of legal protection, transac-
tion costs, and the desirability of the pyramidal ownership structure vis-a-vis
the horizontal ownership structure. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
As we mentioned above, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)
have shown that ﬁrms are often part of a business group with a pyramidal
ownership structure. They studied the 20 largest publicly owned ﬁrms in each
of the 27 wealthiest countries, and concluded that controlling shareholders
often have cash ﬂow rights that are much smaller than their control rights,
mostly due to pyramidal ownership. Similarly, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang
(2000) tracked the ultimate owners of 2980 listed ﬁrms in nine East Asian
countries. They found that the pyramidal ownership structure is common in
these countries (38.7% of the ﬁrms are controlled using a pyramidal structure)
and that there is a substantial deviation between control rights and cash ﬂow
rights.
Pyramidal ownership structures may lead to tunneling and propping. Sev-
eral authors present real world examples of legal tunneling (see in particular
Johnson et al., 2000). One example is the case of Flambo and Barro. Barro,
a Belgian company, accused Flambo, its French controlling shareholder, of
stripping Barro of its assets and trying to pledge the company as a collat-
eral to guarantee Flambo’s debt (Johnson et al., 2000). The court decided
7in favor of Flambo on the basis that Flambo’s conduct was in conformance
with the interests of the business group as a whole. The court argued that it
is legal for a subsidiary to help its parent company out as long as this does
not jeopardize the ﬁnancial condition of the subsidiary. Another example is
that of LG Securities, one of the most proﬁtable ﬁrms in LG Group, which
acquired the money-losing debt-ridden LG Merchant Bank, also part of the
LG Group. This led to a dramatic drop in LG Securities’ share value (Bae,
Kang, and Kim, 2002). Such a connected transaction is legal as no formal
rights have been violated.
There are also some real-world examples of propping. For instance, the
Salim group, one of the biggest business groups in Indonesia, injected funds
obtained from its publicly listed Hong Kong subsidiary into a publicly listed
Indonesian company during the ﬁnancial crisis (see Friedman, Johnson, and
M i t t o n ,2 0 0 3 ) . T h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c eo fp r o p p i n gd o n eb yH o n gK o n g
publicly listed companies in order to boost the performance of their newly
acquired subsidiaries (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2004). Finally, Indian
business groups often inject cash to their ailing subsidiaries in order to reju-
venate them and to prevent them from being expropriated by their lenders
(Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru, 2004).
Whether or not tunneling is legal, it is often hard to verify. Bertrand, Mehta,
and Mullainathan (2002) devise an indirect approach to measure the extent of
tunneling by looking at the cash ﬂow movement through a pyramid, tracking
down the propagation of exogenous shocks to diﬀerent ﬁrms in the pyramidal
chain. They apply their method to Indian business groups for the period
1989-1999. The results indicate that there was signiﬁcant tunneling within
Indian business groups.
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) also raise the question how busi-
8ness groups can continue to persist if they expropriate minority shareholders.9
One possible explanation for this is that minority shareholders do not realize
the extent of tunneling in the group (investors are myopic). One could argue
that minority shareholders of ﬁrms belonging to a pyramidal chain should at
least expect that the controlling family has an incentive to expropriate some
part of their cash ﬂow rights. Investors should be reluctant in the ﬁrst place
to take a minority position in the ﬁrm. Even if they are willing to do so,
they should discount their willingness to pay accordingly. However, empiri-
cal evidence is mixed. A study by Jian and Wong (2003) using a sample of
131 Chinese listed ﬁrms that have conducted related party transactions (i.e.
tunneling) show that at least part of these transactions was indeed antici-
pated by the market. Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2004) analyze a sample
of 328 ﬁlings of connected transactions between Hong Kong publicly listed
companies and their controlling shareholders during the period 1998-2000,
and ﬁnd only limited evidence that the market anticipated the expropriation
by discounting ﬁrms that undertake such connected transactions.
Some recent papers present formal theoretical analyses of tunneling and prop-
ping. Obata (2001) presents a simple model of propping in which he describes
how the pyramidal structure allows ﬁrms to be propped up in case of ﬁnan-
cial distress, if investor protection is weak. Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton
(2002) also model propping, but they use a dynamic model. In that way, they
can explicitly take into account the fact that an entrepreneur may want to
save a ﬁrm from bankruptcy by propping, since future earnings are valuable.
Propping is done by the controlling shareholder in order to revive the ﬁrm,
and to preserve the possibility to carry out tunneling in the future. Both
studies, however, do not consider the establishment of the ownership struc-
ture. That is, they show that if a pyramidal structure is present tunneling or
propping is beneﬁcial to the controlling shareholder. However, this does not
9See also Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).
9necessarily imply that entrepreneurs will prefer the pyramidal structure over
the horizontal structure. Therefore the models of Obata (2001) and Fried-
man, Johnson, and Mitton (2002) cannot actually compare the pyramidal
and horizontal structures.
Wolfenzon (1999) presents a model of tunneling that does take into account
the establishment of the ownership structure. He assumes that operating
proﬁts consist of a veriﬁable part plus a non-veriﬁable part. He shows that
tunneling of non-veriﬁable funds directly to the ultimate controlling share-
holder (as private beneﬁts) may provide a justiﬁcation for the pyramidal
structure. In contrast, in this paper we abstract from tunneling funds from
a ﬁrm directly to the ultimate controlling shareholder (the entrepreneur or
family), since this is equivalent to looting and is generally considered illegal.
Instead we consider tunneling funds from one ﬁrm to another ﬁrm in the
same pyramid. We do not need to resort to non-veriﬁable proﬁts, instead we
consider veriﬁable proﬁts only.
Finally, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) present a related model in which
private beneﬁts play a role, but they focus on the role of business groups as a
substitute for poorly developed ﬁnancial markets. In their model, the family
owns ﬁrm A, which already generated a cash ﬂow. When setting up ﬁrm B,
the family can sell part of the new ﬁrm B.I na d d i t i o n ,s h ec a nu s et h efull
ﬁrm-A cash ﬂow under the pyramidal structure, but only her share of ﬁrm
A’s cash ﬂow under the horizontal structure. That is, under the pyramidal
structure, more funds are available ex ante, since outside investors of ﬁrm A
‘pay’ part of the establishment of ﬁrm B.
103 A benchmark model of tunneling
In this section we describe and solve a simple benchmark model, focusing
only on the decision of how much to tunnel. Consider the following pyramidal
structure. A family owns (part of) ﬁrm A, which itself owns (part of) another
ﬁrm, B.L e tα denote the fraction of ﬁrm A’s shares owned by the family,
and β the fraction of ﬁrm B’s shares owned by ﬁrm A,0< α ≤ 1a n d
0 < β ≤ 1. The family therefore has a fraction α of ﬁrm A’s cash ﬂow rights,
and a fraction αβ of ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow rights. We assume that α and β are
controlling shares, i.e. using the so-called weakest-link approach10 we assume
that min(α,β) ≥ α for some α > 0 which represents the smallest possible
share ownership that still enables the shareholder to exert control. As we
mentioned before, from some empirical studies, values of α of about 10% or
20% are reasonable.
We have a two-period model. Firms A and B each undertake a project
and generate a stream of cash ﬂow of respectively πA > 0a n dπB > 0, in
each period, t =1 ,2. The discount factor for cash ﬂows at t =2i sg i v e n
by 0 < δ ≤ 1. For simplicity we assume that after t =2 ,b o t hﬁrms are
worthless.
We assume that, since the family controls ﬁrm A and thereby ﬁrm B,t h e
family has a possibility to tunnel cash ﬂow from ﬁrm B to ﬁrm A.A s w e
mentioned before, we assume that only tunneling in between ﬁrms within the
same group or pyramid is possible (legal). The family cannot tunnel funds to
their own pockets directly. Tunneling an amount S,0<S≤ πB, is modelled
as taking S away from ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow at t = 1, and ‘transferring’ it
towards ﬁrm A.11
10In many empirical studies, the weakest link of ownership in the pyramidal chain is
used as a measure of control rights (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999,
and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000).
11Note that if there is no threat of bankruptcy for ﬁrm B, it is never proﬁtable in our
11The tunneled money S is invested in a project in ﬁrm A and yields an addi-
tional cash inﬂow of µS at t =2f o rﬁrm A. Here, µ represents the produc-
tivity parameter of the funds reinvested, and we assume that this is the same
for funds coming from ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B. W ea s s u m et h a t0<µ≤ 1/δ,
implying that the family has no incentive to reinvest funds from ﬁrm A back
into the same ﬁrm A. But as we will show below, for these values of the
parameter µ, the controlling family may indeed have an incentive to tunnel
and reinvest funds from ﬁrm B into ﬁrm A. With tunneling, the cash ﬂow
from ﬁrm B at t =1w i l lb eπB − S and the cash ﬂow from ﬁrm A at t =2
will be πA + µS. The family chooses S at t = 1 in order to maximize total
revenues.
Tunneling is costly. Tunneling an amount S>0c o s t skS2/2a tt =1 ,
where k ≥ 0 is a parameter that may, for example, depend on the quality of
minority shareholder protection, that is, the quality of laws. Furthermore,
we let the parameter τ denote the maximum fraction of ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow
πB that can be tunneled to ﬁrm A,0< τ ≤ 1. For example, one can
imagine that some assets are hard to take away from ﬁrm B in the short run.
Alternatively, again, this parameter can be interpreted as describing the legal
conditions. (Clearly, the parameters k and τ may be negatively related, but
we do not model this explicitly.12) The reader should note that although
we interpret the tunneling in our model as legal, this does not mean that
all the available resources in a pyramid ﬁrm can be tunneled. The extent of
minority shareholder protection will limit the amount of resources that can
be tunneled. Thus, in this sense, the parameter τ can also be interpreted
as the “boundary” of legal tunneling. A higher τ implies a better legal
protection for minority shareholders and hence a more restricted domain of
model to tunnel funds from ﬁrm A to ﬁrm B.
12In fact, for simplicity we will drop the parameter k in the later part of the paper,
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Figure 1: Critical values for the (maximum) amount to be tunneled.
tunneling activities that can be considered as legal. Consequently, a higher
τ also implies a lower amount of resources that can be tunneled.
Without tunneling, the present value at t = 1 of the family’s revenues is13
Π
P = α(1 + δ)πA + αβ (1 + δ)πB,
where the superscript P refers to the pyramidal structure. If instead the
family decides to tunnel an amount S, which must satisfy 0 <S≤ τπB,
revenues are
Π
P = απA + αβ (πB − S)
 ~} 
1st period return
+ δ(α(πA + µS)+αβπB)
 ~} 
2 n dp e r i o dr e t u r n
− kS2/2
= α(1 + δ)πA + αβ (1 + δ)πB + α(δµ − β)S − kS2/2.
Clearly, tunneling can never be proﬁtable if δµ<β.S o ,δµ>β is a necessary
condition for tunneling. This is intuitive: if the discounted per-dollar return
is very small, you would rather have a share αβ of ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow (πB)
in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dt h a nr e c e i v i n gas h a r eα of the discounted return from
tunneling (δµS) in the second period.
More precisely, tunneling an amount S is proﬁtable whenever




13We express the revenues in terms of their present value at t = 1 throughout this paper
for expositional convenience.





whenever this expression is positive. If this exceeds τπB,r e v e n u e sa r em a x -
imized by setting S∗ = τπB. Thus, depending on the parameter values,
diﬀerent situations may occur. Figure 1 illustrates the various possibilities.
It shows the value of the maximum amount that may be tunneled, τπB,
together with two ‘critical values’. The ﬁrst one is the value of S which max-
imizes f (S); the second one corresponds to f (S) = 0. It can be veriﬁed that
tunneling the amount τπB is proﬁtable if and only if τπB ≤ 2α(δµ − β)/k =
f−1(0) (i.e. in regions I and II). However, the amount α(δµ − β)/k will in-
stead be tunneled whenever τπB > α(δµ − β)/k (i.e. in regions II and III).
T h u s ,i nr e g i o nIi nF i g u r e1 ,τπB will be tunneled, whereas in regions II and
III only α(δµ − β)/k will be tunneled. Tunneling will occur in equilibrium
whenever δµ>β. We assume this inequality to hold. Then we have
S







in equilibrium. We thus have the following result.
Proposition 1 In our benchmark model of tunneling, the amount tunneled
from ﬁrm B to ﬁrm A by the controlling family in equilibrium is higher if:
(i) the controlling family’s ownership share of ﬁrm A, α,i sg r e a t e r ;
(ii) the discount factor δ is greater;
(iii) the productivity of reinvested funds µ is greater;
(iv) the controlling shareholder’s (ﬁrm A’s) ownership share of ﬁrm B, β,
is smaller;
14(v) tunneling is cheaper, i.e. k is smaller;
(vi) tunneling is easier, for example because legal protection of minority
shareholders is weaker, i.e. τ is greater;
(vii) ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow πB is greater.
Proof. The proposition follows directly from (1).
Points (i)a n d( iv) of the above proposition illustrate the trade-oﬀ between
the incentive alignment eﬀect and the entrenchment eﬀect of large sharehold-
ings. The incentive alignment eﬀect refers to the fact that large shareholdings
help overcome the principal-agent problem; the entrenchment eﬀect states
that large investors may pursue their own interests rather than those of the
ﬁrm. When α is high, the family tunnels more. The entrenchment eﬀect
dominates. But when the ownership stake β of the controlling shareholder
(ﬁrm A)i nﬁrm B is high, the controlling family will tunnel less, and the
incentive alignment eﬀect dominates the entrenchment eﬀect.14
Another important issue that is worth mentioning is the impact of legal
protection on tunneling. In our paper, when the quality of legal protection of
minority shareholders is good (which implies low τ), the pyramidal ownership
structure will not lead to excessive tunneling. Assuming that investors take
into account the existence of tunneling in their valuation, this implies that
(lower-level) pyramidal ﬁrms should have higher market value in countries
with good legal protection than their counterparts in countries with bad legal
protection. La Porta et al. (2002) indeed ﬁnd evidence of higher valuation of
large ﬁrms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders.
14See Claessens et al. (2002) for an empirical analysis of the tradeoﬀ between the en-
trenchment and incentive alignment eﬀects. They show that the separation of control
rights and cash ﬂow rights brought by the pyramidal ownership structure magniﬁes the
entrenchment eﬀect. This is in line with our result that the controlling family may prefer
the pyramidal structure.
15If we examine the family’s revenues, it can be seen that the eﬀect of a change
in β is ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in β decreases the beneﬁt
of tunneling (α(δµ − β)S). On the other hand, it increases the family’s
share of ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow (αβ (1 + δ)πB). A priori it is not clear which
eﬀect dominates. This implies that in the pyramidal structure, it is not
always optimal for the controlling family to have the largest possible degree
of separation between control rights and cash ﬂow rights in ﬁrm B.
The fact that the controlling family indeed chooses to tunnel in the equi-
librium of this benchmark model suggests that when deciding on ownership
structure the family may have a preference for the pyramidal structure, pre-
cisely because this enables proﬁtable tunneling. In the remainder of this
paper, we investigate this issue.
4 Setup of the general model
We now extend the model by incorporating the establishment of ﬁrm B,a s
well as the possibility of propping up ﬁrm B when it is in ﬁnancial distress.
Suppose again that, initially, the family owns a controlling fraction α of the
shares of ﬁrm A.A t t = 0 the family wants to set up ﬁrm B either as an
independent ﬁrm (horizontal structure) or as a pyramidal ﬁrm controlled by
ﬁrm A (pyramidal structure). That is, in the latter case, the family uses
ﬁrm A to establish ﬁrm B. The other two periods, t =1a n dt =2 ,a r e
t h es a m ea sb e f o r e .T h eﬁrms yield cash ﬂows πA > 0a n dπB > 0i nb o t h
periods (unless ﬁrm B goes bankrupt, as we will explain below). There is
no discounting between t =0a n dt = 1 for expositional convenience. This
assumption does not aﬀect the results. At t = 1 the family decides how much
of ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow to tunnel to ﬁrm A. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that assets are easy to transfer and hence k = 0. Consequently the amount
tunneled will only be constrained by ﬁrm B’s cash ﬂow and the parameter
16τ, which describes the simplicity of tunneling and can be interpreted as legal
protection, transaction costs, and/or limitations due to the fact that not all
assets can easily be transferred out of a ﬁrm. Thus, whenever the family ﬁnds
it optimal to tunnel, she will choose to tunnel the amount S∗ = τπB.S i n c e
we focus on legal tunneling and have argued that tunneling funds directly
to the family is illegal, if the horizontal structure is chosen tunneling is not
possible.15
With probability ρ,0< ρ < 1, ﬁrm B will be in ﬁnancial distress in period
1.16 That is, ﬁrm B will go bankrupt unless it is propped up. We assume that
limited liability prevents the controlling shareholder from earning negative
proﬁts. This implies that the cash ﬂow from ﬁrm B in period 1 will be 0 in
case of bankruptcy, rather than some negative amount. However, we assume
that the controlling shareholder can use part of ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-period cash ﬂow
πA to ‘save’ (prop up) ﬁrm B. Note that it seems reasonable to assume that
since it is possible to tunnel funds from B to A,i ti sa l s op o s s i b l et os h i f t
funds from A to B. Under normal circumstances, the family has no incentive
to do this. But if ﬁrm B is in ﬁnancial distress the family may ﬁnd it optimal
to prop ﬁrm B in order to safeguard future cash ﬂow streams. The amount
of funds needed to prop up ﬁrm B is exogenously given as F>0. If ﬁrm B
is propped up, it still yields a cash ﬂow of 0 at t = 1, but it does yield πB > 0
at t = 2. As in the tunneling case, we let the quality of legal protection of
minority shareholders τ limit the share of a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow that can be used
to prop up another ﬁrm. That is, at most τπA c a nb eu s e dt op r o pu pB.17
15Under the horizontal structure, the two ﬁrms are independent legal entities. Therefore,
tunneling funds directly from one ﬁrm to the other is illegal.
16For expositional convenience we assume that ﬁrm A will never be in ﬁnancial distress.
17It is important to note that for propping, the incentives of majority and minority
shareholders of ﬁrm A are aligned. Thus, legal protection in this case may not limit
propping. However, since our parameter τ can alternatively be interpreted as transaction
costs, or as a limitation due to some assets being hard to take away from ﬁrm A,w ed o
model the amount that can be used to prop up B as limited by τ. Ignoring this (replacing
17For the pyramidal structure this implies that ﬁrmB can be saved if and only if
F ≤ τπA. We will assume this condition to hold throughout the paper. After
transferring the amount F to ﬁrm B, the remainder of ﬁrm A’s cash ﬂow, πA−
F, will be distributed among ﬁrm A’s shareholders as dividends according
to their respective equity ownership. Thus, the controlling family and the
outside investors get α(1 − τ)πA and (1 − α)(1− τ)πA, respectively.
Note that the family may use her own funds to prop up ﬁrm B in the pyra-
midal structure as well. That is, in the pyramidal structure, next to shifting
funds up to an amount of τπA from A to B, the family can also shift up
to α(1 − τ)πA out of her own pocket. We discuss this in section 7.1. The
family will ﬁnd it most proﬁtable to do so only when the available amount
to be propped (τπA)f a l l ss h o r tb e l o wt h er e q u i r e da m o u n tF.18
For the horizontal structure, propping up ﬁrm B using funds from ﬁrm A is
not possible as it would imply that funds will have to be pocketed directly by
the family ﬁrst before they are passed to ﬁrm A. Recall that we take this to
be illegal. However, the controlling family of course has the legal right to use
its share of the cash ﬂow obtained from ﬁrm A, i.e. απA. Thus, the family
can use this amount to prop up B. Clearly, in this case, the quality of legal
protection τ is not binding. Obviously, propping in a horizontal structure
will only be possible if F ≤ απA, and if propping occurs the family will end
up with a cash ﬂow of απA − F at the end of period 1.
The establishment of ﬁrm B under either structure requires an investment
of size IB > 0. We assume that the family has no initial cash available, so in
τ by 1) would only strengthen our results.
18Intuitively, whenever it is feasible, it would be better for the family to use other
shareholders’ funds rather then own funds. This is precisely the beneﬁtt h a ti so n l y
accrued under a pyramidal ownership structure and not under a horizontal ownership
structure. In other words, the possibility of tapping other shareholders’ funds relaxes the
ﬁnancing constraint of the family. Including the possibility of using own funds on top of
other shareholders’ funds (if those run short) relaxes the ﬁnancing constraint further, and
in that sense strengthens our results.
18order to establish ﬁrm B af r a c t i o no fﬁrm B’s equity must be sold to outside
investors.19 We assume that investors have an outside option that yields a
net return of zero. In the horizontal case, funds can be raised by selling a
fraction 1−β
H of the shares of ﬁrm B to outside investors, 0 < β
H < 1. The
remaining fraction of the shares, β
H, is owned by the family. In a pyramidal
structure, funds can be raised by selling a fraction 1−β
P of the shares of ﬁrm
B to outside investors, 0 < β
P < 1. The remaining fraction of the shares,
β
P,i sn o wo w n e db yﬁrm A. Note that we require the family to control not
only ﬁrm A, but ﬁrm B as well (otherwise, tunneling and propping are not
possible), so using the weakest-link approach we require α ≥ α and β
P ≥ α
for some α > 0. Further, we also need to verify that indeed the family wants
to set up ﬁrm B,t h a ti s ,w i t hﬁrm B the family’s net expected revenues
should be greater than without it.
We continue to assume that the objective of the controlling family is to
maximize revenues. However, there is now a ‘budget constraint’ which states
that the funds raised must be at least IB. Overall, we have a three-stage
model, in which in the ﬁrst stage (t = 0) the controlling family must choose
the ownership structure and set β
H or β
P in order to maximize revenues
subject to the budget constraint. In the second stage (t = 1), the family
decides the amount to be tunneled from ﬁrm B to ﬁrm A (in the pyramidal
structure only), or whether or not to prop, in case of a bankruptcy threat.
In the third stage (t =2 )t h eﬁnal payoﬀs are realized. Figure 2 summarizes
the sequence of events.
19The family may alternatively choose to sell both a part of ﬁrm A and a part of ﬁrm
B. This seriously complicates our analysis and makes it impossible to compare the two
structures. For that reason, we focus on the case where only a fraction of ﬁrm B’s shares
are sold. In the other extreme case in which only shares of ﬁrm A are sold, we have β =1
so there will be no tunneling, and the incentives of the outside investors and those of the
family are perfectly aligned.
19t=0 t=1 t=2
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Figure 2: Sequence of events.
5 Solving the model
In this section, we discuss the solution of our general model. We solve the
model using backward induction. We start with the horizontal structure. Un-
der this structure, we distinguish two diﬀerent cases: the case where propping
occurs and the case where propping does not occur. Then, we analyze the
pyramidal structure. In the next section, we turn to the comparison of the
two structures.
5.1 Horizontal Structure
5.1.1 When propping occurs
Notice ﬁrst that in the horizontal structure, propping is possible only if F ≤
απA but occurs only if F ≤ β
HδπB as well. If the latter condition is violated,
it is not worthwhile to prop up ﬁrm B. The additional revenues from saving
the ﬁrm, i.e. cash ﬂows of β
HπB at t = 2, do not outweigh the cost of saving
20ﬁrm B at t =1 ,F. Thus, in the horizontal structure propping occurs in







In that case, the family’s expected revenue at t =0i sg i v e nb y
Π
H
prop =( 1 − ρ)

α(1 + δ)πA + β




α(1 + δ)πA − F + β
HδπB

= α(1 + δ)πA + β
H (1 + δ − ρ)πB − ρF.
It is obvious that the revenue is increasing in the fraction of ﬁrm B’s shares
owned by the controlling family (∂ΠH
prop/∂β
H > 0). Hence, the controlling
family will just sell enough shares to outside investors to satisfy the budget
constraint with equality.20 If the family decides to sell the fraction 1 − β
H










taking into account that ﬁrm B will be propped up in case of ﬁnancial dis-
tress. Note that the maximum amount that can be raised while still enabling
the controlling family to retain control over ﬁrm B is (1 − α)(1+δ − ρ)πB.
It is obvious that when the threshold of control α rises,21 the maximum
amount of funds that can be raised by selling part of ﬁrm B’s shares decreases.
Consequently, for a suﬃciently high α it might be possible that the amount
of funds that can be raised while retaining control is not suﬃcient to cover
the set-up costs IB. We assume therefore that IB < (1 − α)(1+δ − ρ)πB.22
20The same argument holds for the other cases we consider below.
21The threshold α is generally high in countries with concentrated ownership structure,
and is low in countries with diﬀused ownership structure.
22We need similar assumptions for the other cases discussed below, but we do not discuss
those explicitly.
21The controlling shareholder thus faces the following maximization problem:
max
βH α(1 + δ)πA + β
H (1 + δ − ρ)πB − ρF









The value of β






(1 + δ − ρ)πB
. (2)
To ensure that indeed establishing ﬁrm B is better than not establishing it
we need
α(1 + δ)πA + β
H∗
prop (1 + δ − ρ)πB − ρF ≥ α(1 + δ)πA,
which can be simpliﬁed into
(1 + δ − ρ)πB − ρF ≥ IB. (3)
This expression is intuitive, saying that the total payoﬀs from establishing
ﬁrm B under the horizontal structure with propping, net of the cost of prop-
ping, should exceed the setup costs. Substituting (2) into the maximand
yields equilibrium expected revenues equal to
Π
H∗
prop = α(1 + δ)πA +( 1+δ − ρ)πB − ρF − IB. (4)
5.1.2 When propping does not occur
Now, let us suppose that propping does not occur, either because the amount
of funds F needed is more than the amount of cash available (απA) or because
propping is ineﬃcient since F ≥ β
HδπB. The family’s expected revenue at
t = 0 is now given by
Π
H
no prop =( 1 − ρ)

α(1 + δ)πA + β
H (1 + δ)πB

+ ρα(1 + δ)πA
= α(1 + δ)πA + β
H (1 − ρ)(1+δ)πB.






for a fraction 1 − β
H of the shares of ﬁrm B. The controlling shareholder
thus faces the following maximization problem:
max
βH α(1 + δ)πA + β
H (1 − ρ)(1+δ)πB
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The value of β
H that will make the budget constraint under the horizontal









no prop is smaller than β
H∗
prop. Since outside investors are willing to
pay less per share (because now ﬁrm B will not be saved in case of ﬁnancial
distress) a larger part of ﬁrmB needs to be soldto obtain the requiredamount
IB. If the following condition is satisﬁed establishing ﬁrm B is better than
not establishing it:
α(1 + δ)πA + β
H∗ (1 − ρ)(1+δ)πB ≥ α(1 + δ)πA
which can be simpliﬁed using (5) into
(1 − ρ)(1+δ)πB ≥ IB. (6)
This expression says that the total payoﬀs from establishing ﬁrm B under the
horizontal structure without propping should exceed the setup costs. Using
(5) equilibrium expected revenues are
ΠH∗
no prop = α(1 + δ)πA +( 1− ρ)(1+δ)πB − IB. (7)
235.2 Pyramidal Structure
Now we turn to the pyramidal structure. Borrowing from our earlier results,
the optimal amount to be tunneled by the controlling family is S∗ = τπB
because k = 0. As we mentioned before, tunneling is possible only if δµ>
β
P, which we assume to hold in equilibrium. Propping is possible only if
F ≤ τπA, which we assume to hold, but occurs only if F ≤ β
PδπB as well.
Below, we assume this latter condition to be satisﬁed in equilibrium. Then
at t = 0 the family’s expected revenue is
Π
P =( 1 − ρ)

α(1 + δ)πA + αβ








α((1 + δ)πA − F)+αβ
PδπB

= α(1 + δ)πA + αβ





Note that the diﬀerence with respect to propping here as compared to the
horizontal case is that now, F is multiplied by α. That is, the outside in-
vestors of ﬁrm A carry part of the burden of propping up B.F o raf r a c t i o n
1 − β










We assume here that investors can discern the extent of tunneling and will
take it into account in their investment decision. This lowers the amount of
money that can be raised by the family.
The family thus faces the following maximization problem:
max
βP α(1 + δ)πA + αβ














24The value of β





(1 + δ − ρ − (1 − ρ)τ)πB
. (9)
For the family’s revenue with ﬁrm B to exceed the revenue without ﬁrm B
we require
α(1 + δ)πA + αβ





≥ α(1 + δ)πA.
Using (9) we can simplify this into
(1 + δ − ρ − (1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τ)πB − ρF ≥ IB. (10)
This expression says that the total payoﬀs from establishing ﬁrm B under the
horizontal structure with propping, net of the cost of propping and tunneling,
should exceed the setup costs. It is obvious that when the probability of
bankruptcy is zero, ρ = 0, and thus there is only tunneling and no propping,
the above expression reduces to
(1 + δ − (1 − δµ)τ)πB ≥ IB. (11)
Finally, using (9), equilibrium payoﬀs under the pyramidal structure can be
rewritten as
ΠP∗ = α(1 + δ)πA +( 1+δ − ρ − (1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τ)απB − ραF − αIB.
(12)
6 Pyramidal structure versus horizontal struc-
ture
At t = 0, the controlling family must decide under which ownership structure
ﬁrm B will be established. For this, we investigate which structure yields
25the highest revenue to the family. We will ﬁr s tc o n s i d e rac a s ei nw h i c h
only tunneling is present and examine whether tunneling alone is enough to
justify the emergence of a pyramidal ownership structure. Then, we turn to
the case where propping does occur.
6.1 Can tunneling alone justify pyramidal ownership?
Since in our model by assumption tunneling is possible (legal) only in the
pyramidal ownership structure, and since the family does indeed use tunnel-
ing if this structure is present, one might expect tunneling to be one of the
reasons to choose the pyramidal ownership structure in the ﬁrst place. In
this subsection, we analyze this issue. Does tunneling alone (in the absence
of propping) provide a justiﬁcation for pyramidal ownership? In order to
answer this question, we let the probability of bankruptcy of ﬁrm B, ρ,e q u a l
zero for now.
Proposition 2 In our model with tunneling only (ρ =0 ) the pyramidal
structure can never be strictly preferred over the horizontal structure.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition implies that tunneling cannot be the sole reason for the
controlling family to choose the pyramidal ownership structure. The rea-
son why the pyramidal ownership structure cannot be optimal under the
tunneling-only case is that when ﬁrm B is established outside investors of
ﬁrm B anticipate that there will be tunneling and thus take it into account
in their investment decision, i.e. in their willingness to pay for B’s shares (8)
(as suggested by Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002, p. 146). If tun-
neling is fully taken into account by the new outside investors, the beneﬁt
of tunneling is oﬀset by the low willingness to pay. Since cash ﬂows from
26ﬁrm B will have to be shared with outside investors of ﬁrm A, the horizontal
structure is preferred.
If outside investors do not realize the full extent of the tunneling by the
controlling family (i.e. if they use some τ  < τ in their calculations) then
it can be shown that under some conditions the pyramidal structure can
indeed be optimal. To illustrate this consider the following modiﬁcation of
the model. Suppose that investors are myopic. For simplicity, we assume
that investors completely ignore the possibility of tunneling, that is, they
believe that the amount tunneled is τ  = 0. Hence, the budget constraint




(1 + δ)πB ≥ IB.W e c a n r e w r i t e t h e
maximization problem of the controlling family, substituting ρ =0 ,a s
max
βP α(1 + δ)πA + αβ
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Again we need the revenue with ﬁrm B to exceed the revenue without ﬁrm
B,
α(1 + δ)πA + αβ
P∗






τπB ≥ α(1 + δ)πA.
Using (13) we can further simplify this into
1+δ
1+δ − τ
(1 + δ − (1 − δµ)τ)πB ≥ IB. (14)
Using(13), equilibrium payoﬀs can be rewritten as
Π
P∗




Upon comparing this revenue to that of the horizontal structure (in the
absence of propping), we can establish the following proposition.
27Proposition 3 In our model with tunneling only (ρ =0 ), if investors are
myopic and do not take tunneling into account in their investment deci-
sion, then the pyramidal structure can be strictly preferred over the horizontal
structure.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, the possibility of tunneling (only) can lead to the emergence of the
pyramidal structure if and only if investors do not (fully) realize the ex-
tent of tunneling, that is, if investors are myopic. Admittedly, in the above
analysis we have used an extreme assumption - that investors do not take
tunneling into account at all. This contradicts ‘the stock price evidence [...]
which suggests that markets at least partly understand the extent of tun-
neling’ (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003, p. 481). It can easily be veriﬁed
that our result continues to hold if investors do realize that there will be
tunneling, but underestimate the extent of it. However, having to resort to
the assumption of myopic investors to justify the existence of pyramidal own-
ership structures is not very satisfying. For that reason, we now return to
our general model where investors are fully rational, and consider propping
in addition to tunneling as a justiﬁcation for the pyramidal structure.
6.2 The choice of structure in the general model
Now we return to the general model, in which both tunneling and propping
may occur. First, let us consider the case in which the parameters of the
model are such that propping occurs in both the horizontal structure and











.23 As before, we compare the family’s revenue
under the two structures.
23Abstracting from corner solutions, in which the equilibrium value of β
P does not
satisfy the expressions derived above.
28Proposition 4 In our model, if propping occurs in both structures, then
the pyramidal structure can never be strictly preferred over the horizontal
structure.
Proof. See appendix.
Although propping up ﬁrm B is cheaper to the family in the pyramidal
structure (since outside investors share in the burden), to outside investors
the main diﬀerence between the two structures is the tunneling. As we
explained above, they take this into account in their investment decision. So,
again, the pyramidal structure cannot yield higher revenues to the family.
Now suppose that propping cannot be done in the horizontal structure be-
cause the amount of funds needed to save ﬁrm B exceeds the total cash
ﬂow rights of the controlling family in ﬁrm A, F>απA.24 We continue






(for example because both τ and πB are relatively
large).25 Comparing the controlling family’s revenue under the two structures
we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In our model, if propping occurs only in the pyramidal struc-
ture but not in the horizontal structure, then the pyramidal structure can be
strictly preferred over the horizontal structure.
Proof. See appendix.
24Alternatively, we could assume that propping in the horizontal structure is feasible,
but not eﬃcient from the point of view of the family, i.e. β
H∗
propδπB <F≤ απA. However,
to analyze this situation in detail we would have to study corner solutions as well, where
the ﬁrm chooses another β which just allows for propping. We choose to abstract from
this, and focus on the case where propping is simply not possible.
25Note that the fact that more funds may be available for propping in the pyramidal
structure than in the horizontal structure is somewhat related to the model of Almeida
and Wolfenzon (2004). They argue that under the pyramidal structure the family has
more funds available to establish ﬁrm B than under the horizontal structure.
29Our analysis shows that even though investors fully realize that there will
be tunneling in the pyramidal structure, they are still willing to invest a
relatively large amount because they know that propping is possible in this
structure. With propping ﬁrm B can be saved from bankruptcy, which is
good for investors. The presence of propping acts as a kind of insurance for
minority investors. They are willing to be expropriated to some extent in
exchange for the larger probability of realizing positive returns from their
investment in the future. One can consider the expropriation by the control-
ling family as a kind of insurance premium that has to be paid by minority
shareholders. Thus, since in the horizontal structure the extent of propping
is limited by the amount of funds the family has available, it is possible that
propping cannot be done under the horizontal structure whereas it can under
the pyramidal structure. When this is the case, the pyramidal structure is
optimal for the controlling family.
7E x t e n s i o n s
In what follows we present two possible extensions of our previous analysis.
7.1 Using cash ﬂow rights to facilitate propping in
pyramidal structure
Our discussions so far assumed that F ≤ τπA, thus the amount of funds
needed to save ﬁrm B is less than the total available funds that can be ex-
propriated from other ﬁrm A’s shareholders. Consequently, it is not necessary
for the family to use their own funds to prop ﬁrm B.
Suppose that we have F>τπA, for instance because τ is suﬃciently low, then
it is necessary for the family to use their own cash ﬂow rights in addition to
30the funds expropriated from other shareholders. Under the pyramidal struc-
ture, the maximum amount of funds that can be raised is τπA+α(1 − τ)πA,
which can be simpliﬁed into,




Thus, when τπA <F≤ (1 − α)τπA + απA propping will still be possi-
ble under the pyramidal structure. Furthermore, the total amount of funds
available under the pyramidal structure ((1 − α)τπA + απA) is obviously
higher than the total amount of funds available under the horizontal struc-
ture (απA).
Consequently, if propping is possible under the horizontal structure, it will
also be possible under the pyramidal structure. However, the reverse is not
true. If propping is possible under the pyramidal structure, it may not be
possible under the horizontal structure. Our previous results, summarized in
Propositions 4 and 5 continue to hold. Thus, when propping occurs in both
structures, the horizontal structure dominates the pyramidal structure. How-
ever, when propping occurs only in the pyramidal structure, the horizontal
structure is dominated by the pyramidal structure.
When F becomes suﬃciently big or τ becomes even smaller, propping may
not be possible to occur in the pyramidal structure even after all available
funds are used ((1 − α)τπA+απA). If this happens, propping will not occur
in the horizontal structure as well. Our result, summarized in Propositions
2 and 3, then apply. Thus, in the absence of propping and when investors
are rational, the horizontal structure dominates the pyramidal structure.
317.2 The relationship between τ and the desirability of
the pyramidal structure
We can express the diﬀerence in revenues that are accrued under the pyra-





Note that the pyramidal structure may be preferred only if propping is pos-
sible in the pyramidal structure, but not in the horizontal structure, and
∆ > 0. Substituting all the relevant parameter values, in our general model
we have
∆ =( 1 − α)IB − ραF − (1 − α)(1+δ − ρ)πB + ρδπB
−α(1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB.
It can be veriﬁed that ∂∆
∂τ < 0. Thus, in the equilibrium of our model the
attractiveness of the pyramidal structure is decreasing in τ. Intuitively, with
rational investors, a larger amount of tunneling implies a lower willingness
to pay for ﬁrm B’s shares. Consequently, the attractiveness of a pyramidal
structure vis-a-vis a horizontal structure for the family decreases. This ex-
plains why the desirability of the pyramidal structure is decreasing in τ.T h i s
result would suggest that pyramids prevail in countries with relatively low
τ, that is high transaction costs or a high quality of legal protection, which
is contrary to the popular belief (see e.g. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer, 1999).
Recall that in the pyramidal structure, when τ decreases, the available funds
may become insuﬃcient to cover for F (F>τπA). In the previous subsec-
tion, we argued that when F>τπA the family may add their own cash ﬂow























Figure 3: The relationship between τ and ∆∗
so. In general, we can argue that propping is possible only if τ is suﬃciently
high. If this is not the case, clearly ∆ < 0.26
The relationship between τ and the attractiveness of the pyramidal structure
(∆) is summarized in Figure 3. In region I, propping is never possible. In
the absence of propping, the horizontal structure dominates the pyramidal
structure (∆ < 0). In regions II and III, propping is possible in the pyramidal
structure, and the pyramidal structure may (region II; ∆ > 0) or may not
(region III; ∆ < 0) dominate the horizontal structure.
Our results, therefore, suggest that there is an inverted U-shape relation-
26Note that this argument focuses on the interpretation of τ as transaction costs, or as
limitations due to some assets being hard to take away from a ﬁrm, and is perhaps less
relevant if τ refers to legal protection only, since for propping incentives of majority and
minority shareholders are aligned.
33Region in Quality of
Figure 3 Country legal protection Pyramids
IU S 5 0 . 0 0
Canada 5 0.20
II Sweden 3 0.78
Singapore 4 0.67
Israel 3 0.60
III Germany 1 0.00
Switzerland 2 0.00
Greece 2 0.00
Table 1: Quality of legal protection and the prevalence of pyramidal owner-
ship. (Data source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999.)
ship between τ and the relative attractiveness of the pyramidal ownership
structure vis-a-vis the horizontal ownership structure. A casual observation
based on the empirical evidence presented by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (1999) lends some support to this inverted U-shape relation-
ship.27 Our variable τ is related to their index of anti-director rights that
measures the degree of legal protection to minority shareholders. The range
of this index is from zero to six. A lower value of this index implies weaker
legal protection, and is equivalent to a higher value of τ.A l s o ,t h e yd e ﬁne
a variable named pyramids that describes the prevalence of pyramids in a
country. It is an average over ﬁrms, where for each ﬁrm the value is one if the
controlling shareholder exercises control through at least one publicly traded
company, and zero otherwise. Table 1 presents the values of these variables
for eight countries, and relates those to the regions in Figure 3. From the
table, we may carefully conclude that there is at least some evidence that
27Note that La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) themselves conclude that
pyramids prevail in countries with weak legal protection. This result is based on grouping
countries according to ‘high’ and ‘low’ protection, and does not follow from the underlying
(disaggregated) data.
34pyramids prevail in countries with intermediate legal protection, and to a
lesser extent in countries with either weak or strong legal protection.28
8 Conclusion
This paper presented a model of tunneling and propping in a pyramidal own-
ership structure. We ﬁrst considered an environment in which only tunneling
is present, and then introduced propping into the framework. The focus of
the paper is to investigate whether or not tunneling and/or propping can
justify the emergence of pyramids. That is, we asked whether a controlling
family who is going to establish a new ﬁr mw o u l dp r e f e rt oe s t a b l i s ht h eﬁrm
in a pyramidal or a horizontal ownership structure.
We have focused on the type of tunneling that is often considered legal,
i.e. where funds are tunneled from one ﬁrm to another ﬁrm in the same
pyramid or business group. We have abstracted from tunneling funds from
a ﬁrm directly to the family’s pockets, as this would be similar to the family
simply donating all the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow to herself as the ultimate controlling
shareholder rather than paying out dividends according to all investor’s cash
ﬂow rights.
We showed that tunneling alone cannot lead to the emergence of the pyra-
midal ownership structure. The reason is that rational minority investors
of the new lower-level ﬁrm will take the tunneling into account in their in-
vestment decision, i.e. in their willingness to pay. As a result, the pyramidal
ownership structure can never be strictly preferred by the controlling family
(even though, once the pyramidal structure is in place, they ﬁnd tunneling
28This empirical evidence is related to the interpretation of τ as legal protection only,
and not to transaction costs. If transaction costs are irrelevant, our model would predict
a negative, rather than inverted U-shaped, relationship. However, we believe that trans-
action costs related to extracting resources may well be higher in countries with stronger
legal protection (due to organizational, bureaucracy-related, and other institutional costs).
35proﬁtable). However, we also show that if investors are myopic and do not
foresee that there will be tunneling or underestimate the degree of tunneling,
then the pyramidal ownership structure may be optimal.
Given that - with rational investors - tunneling cannot be the sole reason
for the emergence of the pyramidal ownership structure, we explore another
closely related phenomenon that may play a role in the choice of ownership
structure. We incorporate propping into the framework. We interpret prop-
ping as ‘reverse’ tunneling, where funds ﬂow from the old, higher-level ﬁrm to
the new, lower-level ﬁrm in the same pyramid, which is done to save the latter
ﬁrm from bankruptcy. We show that when there is some positive probability
of bankruptcy and the controlling family is able to save the new ﬁrm from
bankruptcy by propping in the pyramidal ownership structure, this structure
can indeed be preferred over the horizontal structure. The reason is that even
though investors expect that there will be tunneling in the pyramidal struc-
ture, they are still willing to invest a relatively large amount because they
know that propping is possible. With propping, the new ﬁrm B can be saved
from a bankruptcy, so propping acts as a kind of insurance for these minority
investors. They are willing to be expropriated to some extent (by tunneling)
in exchange for the increased probability of realizing positive returns from
their investment in the future.
Of course, in the horizontal structure the family might also be able to prop
up ﬁrm B, now using their own funds (in our model, their share of the old
ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow) rather than the old ﬁrm’s funds. But as we show using our
model, depending on the values of the parameters, the family may well have
less funds available for propping than the old ﬁrm has and therefore propping
may be possible in the pyramidal structure but not in the horizontal struc-
ture. Note that the family may use her own funds to prop up ﬁrm B in the
pyramidal structure as well. Including this possibility only strengthens our
results, in the sense that this makes the pyramidal structure more attractive.
36Our model predicts an inverted U-shape relationship between the parameter
τ which indicates the simplicity of moving funds around, and the prevalence
of pyramids, in the sense that the attractiveness of the pyramidal structure
is highest if τ is intermediate. Intuitively, if both tunneling and propping
are hard (due to high transaction costs and/or strong legal protection), the
theoretical beneﬁt of the pyramidal structure cannot be exploited. If tun-
neling and propping are very easy (low transaction costs and/or weak legal
protection), the beneﬁts of propping will be outweighed by the negative eﬀect
of tunneling on the willingness to pay of outside investors, and the horizon-
tal structure is again preferred. Only in intermediate cases, the beneﬁto f
propping may outweigh the negative eﬀect of tunneling, and the family may
prefer the pyramidal structure over the horizontal structure. We presented
some empirical support for this relationship.
We have abstracted from the possibility that the old ﬁrm itself may go
bankrupt. Our model could be extended by adding a positive probability for
this ﬁrm to be in ﬁnancial distress and to go bankrupt unless it is propped
up. However, we do not expect this to aﬀect our qualitative results. In our
current setup, in the pyramidal structure funds will be tunneled from the
lower-level ﬁrm B to the old, higher-level ﬁrm A for some parameter val-
ues. By introducing the possibility of bankruptcy of ﬁrm A, funds will move
in this direction for a wider range of parameters. Just like before, outside
investors will take this into account (unless they are myopic).
With respect to the amount of money that is needed to prop up the ﬁrm in
case of ﬁnancial distress, we have focused on an exogenously given amount.
However, in general this amount will not be given but rather be distributed
according to some probability distribution function. In that case, our result
will still hold, provided that the probability of being in the relevant interval
is suﬃciently large.
37Summarizing, depending on the values of the parameters tunneling may jus-
tify the pyramidal structure, but only with myopic investors or in combina-
tion with propping to save the new, lower-level ﬁrm from bankruptcy.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
With tunneling only (ρ = 0), the pyramidal structure is strictly preferred
over the horizontal structure if and only if, substituting ρ =0 ,∆ = ΠP∗ −
ΠH∗
no prop > 0. Using (7) and (12) and taking into account that ρ =0 ,w ec a n
simplify the above expression into
∆ =( 1− α)IB − (1 − α)(1+δ)πB − α(1 − δµ)τπB > 0,
which is equivalent to the following condition:
(1 + δ)πB +
α
1 − α
(1 − δµ)τπB <I B.
We should also make sure that the feasibility conditions (6) and (11) are
satisﬁed. Substituting ρ = 0, we can simplify these feasibility conditions into
(1 + δ)πB ≥ IB,
(1 + δ − (1 − δµ)τ)πB ≥ IB.
It can be seen that the second condition is stricter than the ﬁrst one, so we
can focus on the second condition. Thus, the pyramidal structure is strictly
preferred over the horizontal structure when both this condition and the
condition ∆ > 0 hold. That would require
(1 + δ)πB +
α
1 − α
(1 − δµ)τπB < (1 + δ)πB − (1 − δµ)τπB,
that is α
1−α < −1. Clearly this is impossible because α
1−α > 0.
38P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
With tunneling only (ρ = 0) and myopic investors who do not take tunneling
into account, the pyramidal structure is strictly preferred over the horizontal
structure if and only if, substituting ρ =0 ,∆ = ΠP∗
myopic−ΠH∗
no prop > 0. Using









IB − (1 − α)(1+δ)πB − (1 − δµ)ατπB > 0,





(1 + δ)(1− α)+ατ

πB <I B.
The feasibility conditions (6) and (14) can be rewritten as
(1 + δ)πB ≥ IB,
1+δ
1+δ − τ
(1 + δ − (1 − δµ)τ)πB ≥ IB.
It can be veriﬁed that the ﬁrst condition is stricter than the second one, so
we can focus on the ﬁrst condition. Thus, the pyramidal structure is strictly
preferred over the horizontal condition when both this condition and the






(1 + δ)(1− α)+ατ

πB < (1 + δ)πB,
that is
ατδµ
(1+δ)(1−α)+ατ > 0. This condition is satisﬁed for all feasible values of
α, τ, δ,a n dµ. Thus, the pyramidal structure may be strictly preferred over
the horizontal structure in this case.
39P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
With propping in both structures, the pyramidal structure is strictly pre-
ferred over the horizontal structure if and only if ∆ = ΠP∗ − ΠH∗
prop > 0,
w h i c hc a nb ee x p r e s s e da s
∆ =( 1 − α)IB +( 1− α)ρF
− (1 − α)(1+δ − ρ)πB − α(1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB > 0.
using (4) and (12). This expression can be rewritten as
(1 + δ − ρ)πB +
α
1 − α
(1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB − ρF<I B.
From (3) and (10) the feasibility conditions are
(1 + δ − ρ)πB − ρF ≥ IB,
(1 + δ − ρ)πB − (1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB − ρF ≥ IB.
The second condition is stricter than the ﬁrst one, so we can focus on the
second condition. Thus, the pyramidal structure is strictly preferred over the
horizontal structure when both this condition and the condition ∆ > 0h o l d .
For these two conditions to be satisﬁed simultaneously, we require
(1 + δ − ρ)πB +
α
1 − α
(1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB − ρF
< (1 + δ − ρ)πB − (1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB − ρF,
that is, α
1−α < −1. Clearly this can never be satisﬁed because α
1−α > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
With propping in the pyramidal structure only, the pyramidal structure is
strictly preferred over the horizontal structure if and only if ∆ = ΠP∗ −
40ΠH∗
no prop > 0, which can be expressed as
∆ =( 1 − α)IB − ραF − (1 − α)(1+δ − ρ)πB
+ ρδπB − α(1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB > 0
using (7) and (12). This expression can be rewritten as











From (6) and (10) the feasibility conditions are
(1 − ρ)(1+δ)πB ≥ IB,
(1 + δ − ρ)πB − (1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB − ρF ≥ IB.
It is not clear beforehand which condition is more restrictive. Therefore, we
consider two cases.
First assume that the ﬁrst feasibility condition is more restrictive. Then the
pyramidal structure is strictly preferred over the horizontal structure when
both this condition and the condition ∆ > 0 hold. This requires










< (1 − ρ)(1+δ)πB,
which can be rewritten as
(1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB − ρδπB + ρF<0. (17)
It can easily be veriﬁed that the condition for the ﬁrst feasibility condition to
be more strict than the second reduces to precisely this expression. That is,
whenever the ﬁrst feasibility condition is more strict, this expression holds
true, and the pyramidal structure may dominate (depending on the values
of other parameters).
41Second, assume that the second feasibility condition is more restrictive. Then
the pyramidal structure is strictly preferred over the horizontal structure
when both this condition and the condition ∆ > 0 hold. This requires










< (1 + δ − ρ)πB − (1 − ρ)(1− δµ)τπB − ρF,
which can be simpliﬁed into precisely the same condition as before, (17).
Clearly, if the second feasibility condition is more restrictive the pyramidal
structure can thus never be preferred over the horizontal structure.
Combining, the pyramidal structure dominates in this situation if and only
if the ﬁrst feasibility condition is more restrictive than the second. That
is, if (17) holds. To illustrate that this may indeed occur at least for some
parameter values, consider the following example. Let δ = µ = τ =1 ,
ρ =0 .5, α =0 .8, πA =7 ,πB =1 0 ,IB =4 ,F = 6. It can easily be veriﬁed
that (17) is satisﬁed for these parameter values. Also, it can easily be seen
that the other conditions that we require for this case (with propping in the





,w h e r e
β
P∗ =0 .6n o w ,a r es a t i s ﬁed. Finally, we have ∆ = 2
5 > 0. Thus, indeed,
in this example the case with propping in the pyramidal structure only is
the relevant case, setting up ﬁrm B in either structure is feasible, and the
pyramidal structure dominates.
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